The stakes were high because Hanoi had beefed up its southern coastal defenses by adding four new Swatow gunboats at Quang Khe, a naval base 75 miles north of the DMZ, and ten more just to the south at Dong Hoi. A subsequent review of the SIGINT reports revealed that this later interceptMcNamaras smoking gunwas in fact a follow-on, more in-depth report of the August 2 action. The Maddox planned to sail to 16 points along the North Vietnam coast, ranging from the DMZ north to the Chinese border. They issued a recall order from Haiphong to the port commander and communications relay boat two hours after the torpedo boat squadron command issued its attack order. In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. The publicity caused by the Tonkin Gulf incident and the subsequent resolution shifted attention away from covert activities and ended high-level debate over the wisdom of secret operations against North Vietnam. Most uncertainty has long centered on the alleged second attack of August 4. Unlike much else that followed, this incident is undisputed, although no one from the US government ever admitted publicly that the attack was likely provoked by its covert actions. Illumination rounds shot skyward, catching the patrol boats in their harsh glare. Badly damaged, the boat limped home. Those early mistakes led U.S. destroyers to open fire on spurious radar contacts, misinterpret their own propeller noises as incoming torpedoes, and ultimately report an attack that never occurred. There was no way to get a commando team ashore to plant demolition charges; they would have do what damage they could with the boats guns.3 (Hanoi remains muzzy on the second incident, Aug. 4, presumably since clearly it took place in international waters, the Vietnamese claim of "defensive reaction" is a bit wobbly.). Today, it is believed that this second attack did not occur and was merely reports from jittery radar and sonar operators, but at the time it was taken as evidence that Hanoi was raising the stakes against the United States. The ships sonar operator reported a noise spikenot a torpedowhich the Combat Information Center (CIC) team mistook for report of an incoming torpedo. A North Vietnamese patrol boat also trailed the American ships, reporting on their movements to Haiphong. In turn, that means WebThe Gulf of Tonkin and the Vietnam War. The Desoto patrol continued with another destroyer, the Turner Joy (DD-951), coming along to ward off further trouble. In 2005 documents were released proving that Johnson had fabricated the Gulf of Tonkin incident in order to justify attacking North Vietnam. A brief account of the raids is in MACVSOG 1964 Command History, Annex A, 14 January 1965, pp. This was the only time covert operations against the North came close to being discussed in public. As Communist communications activity was rising rapidly, American senior leaders were increasing support to the South Vietnamese government. As the torpedo boats continued their high-speed approach, Maddox was ordered to fire warning shots if they closed inside 10,000 yards. In any event, the attack took place in broad daylight under conditions of clear visibility. American SIGINT analysts assessed the North Vietnamese reporting as probable preparations for further military operations against the Desoto patrol. With that report, after nearly four decades, the NSA officially reversed its verdict on the events of August 4, 1964, that had led that night to President Lyndon Johnsons televised message to the nation: The initial attack on the destroyer Maddox, on August 2, was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two U.S. destroyers with torpedoes. Then, everyones doubts were swept away when a SIGINT intercept from one of the North Vietnamese torpedo boats reported the claim that it had shot down two American planes in the battle area.
Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964) | National Archives The fig leaf of plausible denial served McNamara in this case, but it was scant cover. 8. Senate investigations in 1968 and 1975 did little to clarify the events or the evidence, lending further credence to the various conspiracy theories. CIA Bulletin, 3 August 1964 (see Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965 [Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986], p. 422). 313-314.
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution As far as the headlines were concerned, that was it, but the covert campaign continued unabated. Thats what all the country wants, because Goldwater's raising so much hell about how he's gonna blow 'em off the moon, and they say that we oughtn't to do anything that the national interest doesn't require. 9/11. This explanation held briefly, long enough for President Johnson -- admittedly not inclined to engage in what might be called oververification -- to rush the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution through Congress. Consequently, while Maddox was in the patrol area, a South Vietnamese commando raid was underway southwest of its position. PTF-1 and PTF-5 raced toward shore. Two days later, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution sailedthrough both houses of Congress by a vote of 504 to 2. The conspiracy theory has been dying for several years, and this work will probably be a stake through its heart. The Maddox fired againthis time to killhitting the second North Vietnamese boat just as it launched two torpedoes.
Tonkin Gulf Sign up to get updates about new releases and event invitations. He is the author of. The only solution was to get rid of the evidence. During May, Admiral U. S. G. Sharp, the Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief, had suggested that 34A raids could be coordinated "with the operation of a shipboard radar to reduce the possibility of North Vietnamese radar detection of the delivery vehicle." Retrieved from https://www.thoughtco.com/vietnam-war-gulf-of-tonkin-incident-2361345. Heavy machine-gun bullets riddled PTF-6, tearing away part of the port bow and wounding four South Vietnamese crewmen, including Lieutenant Son. Hickman, Kennedy. ThoughtCo. It was 20 minutes into the new day, 31 July, when PTF-3 and PTF-6, both under the command of Lieutenant Sonconsidered one of the best boat skippers in the covert fleetreached Hon Me and began their run at the shore. William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part II, 1961-1964, pp. The history stops with the U.S. Navy moving into full combat duty -- the naval and air interdictions in South and North Vietnam -- the subject of future volumes. This was almost certainly a reaction to the recent 34A raids. Incidentally, the first volume, Setting the Stage: To 1959, contains one of the best brief summaries I've read of Vietnam history from the end of World War II through the 1954 Geneva Conference. It is difficult to imagine that the North Vietnamese could come to any other conclusion than that the 34A and Desoto missions were all part of the same operation. The three torpedo boats continued through the American barrage and launched their torpedoes at 1516. WebTo many online conspiracy theorists, the biggest false flag operation of all time was the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Hanoi at the time denied all, leading to a third interpretation that remains alive today as what might be called the Stockdale thesis. In the first few days of August 1964, a series of events off the coast of North Vietnam and decisions made in Washington, D.C., set the United States on a course that would largely define the next decade and weigh heavily on American foreign policy to this day. For the rest of the war they would be truly secretand in the end they were a dismal failure. It is not NSA's intention to prove or The report also identifies what SIGINT couldand could nottell commanders about their enemies and their unreliable friends in the war. Non-subscribers can read five free Naval History articles per month. 2. The rounds set some of the buildings ablaze, keeping the defenders off balance. When Did the U.S. Holding their vector despite the gunfire, the boats rushed in, pouring 20-mm and 40-mm fire and 57-mm recoilless rifle rounds into their target. Both sides, however, spent August 3 reviewing their contingency plans and analyzing lessons learned from the incident. That night and morning, while cruising in heavy weather, the ships received radar, radio, and sonar reports that signaled another North Vietnamese attack. 10. This is another government conspiracy that's true. 1. WebOn August 7, 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing President Johnson to take any measures he believed were necessary to retaliate and to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Unlike McNamara, Johnson, on the morning of Aug.4,1964, was in less of a hurry to respond to an attack. In the future, conventional operations would receive all the attention. For some reason, however, the second Desoto Mission, to be conducted by Maddox, was not canceled, even though it was scheduled to start at the same time that a late July commando mission was being launched. At Hon Nieu, the attack was a complete surprise. Surprised by the North Vietnamese response, Johnson decided that the United States could not back away from the challenge and directed his commanders in the Pacific to continue with the Desoto missions. In response, the North Vietnamese built up their naval presence around the offshore islands. On Tuesday morning, Aug. 4, 1964, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara called President Lyndon Johnson with a report about a possible confrontation brewing in southeast Asia. Ships radar detected five patrol boats, which turned out to be P-4 torpedo boats and Swatows. Because the North Vietnamese had fewer than 50 Swatows, most of them up north near the important industrial port of Haiphong, the movement south of one-third of its fleet was strong evidence that 34A and the Desoto patrols were concerning Hanoi. Unable to catch the fast South Vietnamese PTFs, the government in Hanoi elected to strike instead at USS Maddox. After the war, Hanoi officials not only acknowledged the event but deemed it important enough to designate its date, Aug. 2, as the Vietnamese Navy's Anniversary Day, "the day our heroic naval forces went out and chased away Maddox and Turner Joy." By including the orders and operational guidance provided to the units involved, the study develops the previously missing context of the intelligence and afteraction reports from the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. ThoughtCo, Feb. 16, 2021, thoughtco.com/vietnam-war-gulf-of-tonkin-incident-2361345. By late July 1964, SOG had four Nasty-class patrol boats, designated PTF-3, PTF-4, PTF-5, PTF-6 (PTFfast patrol boat). Navy, Of course, none of this was known to Congress, which demanded an explanation for the goings-on in the Tonkin Gulf. A distinction is made in these pages between the Aug. 2 "naval engagement" and the somewhat more ambiguous Aug. 4 "naval action," although Marolda and Fitzgerald make it clear they accept that the Aug. 4 action left one and possibly two North Vietnamese torpedo-firing boats sunk or dead in the water. 302-303. When you visit the site, Dotdash Meredith and its partners may store or retrieve information on your browser, mostly in the form of cookies. Over the next few years, Johnson used the resolution to rapidly escalate American involvement in the Vietnam War. JCS, "34A Chronology of Events," (see Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 424); Porter, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation (Stanfordville, NY: 1979), vol. AIDS Brotherhood Symbology The Illuminati Flame . Lyndon Johnson on August 5, 1964, assertedly in reaction to two In the meantime, aboard Turner Joy, Captain Herrick ordered an immediate review of the nights actions. Given the maritime nature of the commando raids, which were launched from Da Nang, the bulk of the intelligence collecting fell to the Navy. The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a complex naval event in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of Vietnam, that was presented to the U.S. Congress on August 5, 1964, as two unprovoked attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on the destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy of the U.S. On 7 August, the Senate passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, allowing the administration greater latitude in expanding the war by a vote of 88 to 2.
How the Gulf of Tonkin Incident Embroiled the US in the Vietnam The bullets struck the destroyer; the torpedo missed. Launching on Aug. 5, Operation Pierce Arrow saw aircraft from USS Ticonderoga and USS Constellation strike oil facilities at Vinh and attack approximately 30 North Vietnamese vessels. This time, however, President Johnson reacted much more skeptically and ultimately decided to take no retaliatory action. The most popular of these is that the incident was either a fabrication or deliberate American provocation. The ships gunners used the standard 5 mil offset to avoid hitting the boats. The NSA report exposes translation and analytical errors made by the American SIGINT analystserrors that convinced the naval task force and national authorities that the North had ordered a second attack on August 4, and thus led Maddoxs crew to interpret its radar contacts and other information as confirmation that the ship was again under attack. The NSA report is revealing. Subsequent SIGINT reporting and faulty analysis that day further reinforced earlier false impressions.
Gulf Of Tonkin They were nicknamed "gassers" because they burned gasoline rather than diesel fuel. 2, pp. THIS SECOND volume of the U.S. Navy's multivolume history of the Vietnam War is bound in the same familiar rich blue buckram that has styled official Navy histories since the Civil War and hence resembles its predecessors. The North Vietnamese turned for shore with the Maddox in pursuit. Perhaps that is the most enduring lesson from Americas use of SIGINT in the Vietnam War in general and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in particular. Mr. Interview, authors with James Hawes, 31 March 1996. The maximum closure distance was originally established at 20 nautical miles, but the commander of the U.S. One 12.7mm machine bullet hit Maddox before the boats broke off and started to withdraw. When the boats reached that point, Maddox fired three warning shots, but the torpedo boats continued inbound at high speed. You've read 1 out of 5 free articles of Naval History this month. The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a brief confrontation between United States and North Vietnamese warships, off the coast of northern Vietnam in August 1964. https://www.historynet.com/case-closed-the-gulf-of-tonkin-incident/, Jerrie Mock: Record-Breaking American Female Pilot, When 21 Sikh Soldiers Fought the Odds Against 10,000 Pashtun Warriors, Few Red Tails Remain: Tuskegee Airman Dies at 96. Ticonderoga ordered four A-1H Skyraiders into the air to support the ships. Suddenly, North Vietnamese guns opened fire from the shore. ", "No," replied McCone. Not all wars are made for navies, and the U.S. Navy had to insinuate itself into the Vietnam one and carve out a role. Keep supporting great journalism by turning off your ad blocker. The North Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made all this clear in September when it published a "Memorandum Regarding the U.S. War Acts Against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the First Days of August 1964." The errors made in the initial analysis were due to a combination of inexperience, limited knowledge of North Vietnams operations and an operational imperative to ensure that the U.S. Navy ships would not be caught by surprise.
Milestones: 19611968 - Office of the Historian Seeking to follow the established policy of containment, Johnson and his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, began increasing military aid to South Vietnam. Gulf of Tonkin - A secret report reveals how easily soldiers, spies and politicians can jump to a conclusion and plunge the country into war. While there was some doubt in Washington regarding the second attack, those aboard Maddox and Turner Joy were convinced that it had occurred. As is common with specialized histories -- what I call the "tunnels of Cu Chi" syndrome -- this book will tell most readers more about the U.S. Navy in Vietnam than they care to know. (2021, February 16). This was granted, and four F-8 Crusaders were vectored towards Maddox's position. We have no intention of yielding to pressure. He then requested the passage of a resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in Southeast Asia." At 0354 on 2 August, the destroyer was just south of Hon Me Island. WebMany historians now agree that the Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which many believed North Vietnamese ships had attacked American naval forces, may not have occurred in the way it was described at the time.
Americas Vietnam War had begun in earnest. The U.S. ships were supposed to remain well outside North Vietnams claimed five nautical mile territorial limit. $22. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) decided to resume Maddoxs Desoto patrol, but at a greater distance from the coast, accompanied by Turner Joy and supported by aircraft from Ticonderoga. The North Vietnamese coastal radars also tracked and reported the positions of U.S. aircraft operating east of the ships, probably the combat air patrol the Seventh Fleet had ordered in support. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident, 2. Until 1964, Desoto patrols stayed at least 20 miles away from the coast. The Tonkin Gulf Incident in the past two decades has been treated by at least three full-scale studies, dealt with at length by Congressional committees and extensively referenced in general histories, presidential memoirs and textbooks on the U.S. legislative function. North Vietnams immediate concern was to determine the exact position and status of its torpedo boats and other forces. Taking evasive action, they fired on numerous radar targets. In this case, perception was much more important than reality.10. What will be of interest to the general reader is the treatment of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Both of these messages reached Washington shortly after 1400 hours EDT. Each sides initial after-action review was positive. For the Navys official account stating that both incidents occurred and that 34A and Desoto were "entirely distinct," see Marolda and Fitzgerald, pp. Seventh Fleet reduced it to 12 nautical miles. LBJ knew the Vietnam War was a disaster in the making. But the administration dithered, informing the embassy only that "further OPLAN 34A operations should be held off pending review of the situation in Washington. The Gulf of Tonkin act became more controversial as opposition to the war mounted. After suggesting a "complete evaluation" of the affair before taking further action, he radioed requesting a "thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft." A Senate investigation revealed that the Maddox had been on an intelligence Any escalation in the bombing of the North risked provoking the Russians or, more likely, the Chinese. PRX is a 501(c)(3) organization recognized by the IRS: #263347402. Efforts to communicate with the torpedo boats failed, probably because of language and communications equipment incompatibility. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident took place on Aug. 2 and 4, 1964, and helped lead to greater American involvement in the Vietnam War. The first Desoto Mission was conducted by USS Craig (DD-885) in March 1964. To increase the chances of success, SOG proposed increased raids along the coast, emphasizing offshore bombardment by the boats rather than inserting commandos. Both sides claimed successes in the exchange that they did not actually achieve. Within the year, U.S. bombers would strike North Vietnam, and U.S. ground units would land on South Vietnamese soil. The tug departed Haiphong at approximately 0100 hours on August 4, while the undamaged torpedo boat, T-146, was ordered to stay with the crippled boats and maintain an alert for enemy forces. At about 0600, the two U.S. destroyers resumed the Desoto patrol. It set a very terrible precedent, which is that he would go on to escalate further, not with any striking confidence that his objectives will be achieved, but only with the assurance that, unless he embarked on these massive military escalations, America would fail in Vietnam and he might well be labeled the only president in American history to lose a war.. WebUnderground Knowledge host James Morcan discloses what really happened in 1964's Gulf of Tonkin Incident which started the Vietnam War. Originally begun by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1961, 34A was a highly-classified program of covert operations against North Vietnam.
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